[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness

Actually there are several but one is trivially fixed

1.	FSACTL_GET_NEXT_ADAPTER_FIB ioctl does not lock dev->fib_list
but needs to
2.	Ditto for FSACTL_CLOSE_GET_ADAPTER_FIB
3.	It is possible to construct an attack via the SRB ioctls where
the user obtains assorted elevated privileges. Various approaches are
possible, the trivial ones being things like writing to the raw media
via scsi commands and the swap image of other executing programs with
higher privileges.

So the ioctls should be CAP_SYS_RAWIO - at least all the FIB manipulating
ones. This is a bandaid fix for #3 but probably the ioctls should grow
their own capable checks. The other two bugs need someone competent in that
driver to fix them.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <aacraid@adaptec.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
index 0523cc6..143e4c1 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c
@@ -517,6 +517,8 @@ static struct device_attribute *aac_dev_attrs[] = {
 static int aac_ioctl(struct scsi_device *sdev, int cmd, void __user * arg)
 {
        struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev *)sdev->host->hostdata;
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+               return -EPERM;
        return aac_do_ioctl(dev, cmd, arg);
 }