--- /dev/null
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
+ "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
+ RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
+ RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
+ RSA_eay_mod_exp,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
+ RSA_eay_init,
+ RSA_eay_finish,
+ 0, /* flags */
+ NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0 /* rsa_verify */
+ };
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
+ {
+ return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
+ }
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f,ret;
+ int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
+ unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+ /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+ * length of the modulus */
+ j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+ to[k]=0;
+
+ r=num;
+err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
+ if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
+ do { \
+ if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
+ ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
+ err_instr \
+ } while(0)
+
+static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
+ BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+ /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
+
+ /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
+ * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
+ * of binary compatibility can't */
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
+ {
+ /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
+ if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
+ BN_free(Ai);
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* signing */
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f,ret;
+ int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
+ unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
+
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
+ * length of the modulus */
+ j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
+ to[k]=0;
+
+ r=num;
+err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (local_blinding)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f,ret;
+ int j,num=0,r= -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+ ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
+
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ p=buf;
+ j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (local_blinding)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+/* signature verification */
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM f,ret;
+ int i,num=0,r= -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+
+ BN_init(&f);
+ BN_init(&ret);
+ ctx=BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+
+ num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
+ if (flen > num)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+
+ p=buf;
+ i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+
+ switch (padding)
+ {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_clear_free(&f);
+ BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return(r);
+ }
+
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
+ int ret=0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+
+ BN_init(&m1);
+ BN_init(&r1);
+ BN_init(&vrfy);
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
+ {
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
+ if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
+ {
+ rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+ /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+ * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+ if (r0->neg)
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+ * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+ * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (r0->neg)
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (vrfy.neg)
+ if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ }
+ ret=1;
+err:
+ BN_clear_free(&m1);
+ BN_clear_free(&r1);
+ BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return(ret);
+ }
+
+static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
+ {
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+#endif
projects / bcm963xx.git / blobdiff