+++ /dev/null
-/* v3_purp.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2001.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
-
-static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
- const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
-
-static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
- {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
- {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
-};
-
-#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
-
-static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
- const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
-{
- return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
-}
-
-/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
- * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things. */
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
-{
- int idx;
- const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- if(id == -1) return 1;
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
- if(idx == -1) return -1;
- pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
-{
- if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
- return 0;
- }
- *p = purpose;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
-{
- if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
- return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
-{
- if(idx < 0) return NULL;
- if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
- return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
-{
- int i;
- X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
- for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
- xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
- if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
-{
- X509_PURPOSE tmp;
- int idx;
- if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
- return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
- tmp.purpose = purpose;
- if(!xptable) return -1;
- idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
- if(idx == -1) return -1;
- return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
- int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
- char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
-{
- int idx;
- X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
- flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
- flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
- /* Get existing entry if any */
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
- /* Need a new entry */
- if(idx == -1) {
- if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-
- /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
- if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
- OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
- }
- /* dup supplied name */
- ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
- ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
- if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
- ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
- /* Set all other flags */
- ptmp->flags |= flags;
-
- ptmp->purpose = id;
- ptmp->trust = trust;
- ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
- ptmp->usr_data = arg;
-
- /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
- if(idx == -1) {
- if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
- X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
- {
- if(!p) return;
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
- {
- if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- OPENSSL_free(p->name);
- OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
- }
- OPENSSL_free(p);
- }
- }
-
-void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
-{
- int i;
- sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
- for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
- xptable = NULL;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
- return xp->purpose;
-}
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
- return xp->name;
-}
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
- return xp->sname;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
- return xp->trust;
-}
-
-static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
- {
- return *a - *b;
- }
-
-int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
- {
- /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
- * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
- * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
- * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
- * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
- * searched using bsearch.
- */
-
- static int supported_nids[] = {
- NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
- NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
- NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
- NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
- NID_ext_key_usage /* 126 */
- };
-
- int ex_nid;
-
- ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
-
- if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
- return 0;
-
- if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
- sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
- (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
-{
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
- EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
- X509_EXTENSION *ex;
-
- int i;
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
-#endif
- /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
- if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
- /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
- if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
- /* Handle basic constraints */
- if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
- if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
- if(bs->pathlen) {
- if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- || !bs->ca) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- x->ex_pathlen = 0;
- } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
- } else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
- BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
- }
- /* Handle key usage */
- if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
- if(usage->length > 0) {
- x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
- if(usage->length > 1)
- x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
- } else x->ex_kusage = 0;
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
- }
- x->ex_xkusage = 0;
- if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
- for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
- switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
- case NID_server_auth:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
- break;
-
- case NID_client_auth:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
- break;
-
- case NID_email_protect:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
- break;
-
- case NID_code_sign:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
- break;
-
- case NID_ms_sgc:
- case NID_ns_sgc:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
- break;
-
- case NID_OCSP_sign:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
- break;
-
- case NID_time_stamp:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
- break;
-
- case NID_dvcs:
- x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
- break;
- }
- }
- sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
- }
-
- if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
- if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
- else x->ex_nscert = 0;
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
- ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
- }
- x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
- {
- ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
- if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
- continue;
- if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
- {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
- break;
- }
- }
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
-}
-
-/* CA checks common to all purposes
- * return codes:
- * 0 not a CA
- * 1 is a CA
- * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
- * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
- * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
- */
-
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
-#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
- (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
-static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
-{
- /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
- /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
- else return 0;
- } else {
- /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
- if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
- /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
- /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
- else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
- && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
- /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
-{
- if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
-
- return check_ca(x);
-}
-
-/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
-static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
-{
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if(!ca_ret) return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
- else return 0;
-}
-
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
- if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
- /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
- if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
- /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
- if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
- if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
-
- if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
- /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
- if(!ret || ca) return ret;
- /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* common S/MIME checks */
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
- if(ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = check_ca(x);
- if(!ca_ret) return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
- else return 0;
- }
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
- if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
- /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
- if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if(!ret || ca) return ret;
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- int ret;
- ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
- if(!ret || ca) return ret;
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- if(ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
- else return 0;
- }
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
- * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
- */
-
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
- value (2)? */
- if(ca) return check_ca(x);
- /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
- * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
- * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
- * subject name.
- * These are:
- * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
- * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
- * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
- * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
- * codes for X509_verify_cert()
- */
-
-int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
-{
- if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
- X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
- if(subject->akid) {
- /* Check key ids (if present) */
- if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
- /* Check serial number */
- if(subject->akid->serial &&
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
- subject->akid->serial))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
- /* Check issuer name */
- if(subject->akid->issuer) {
- /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
- * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
- * There may be more than one but we only take any
- * notice of the first.
- */
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
- GENERAL_NAME *gen;
- X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
- int i;
- gens = subject->akid->issuer;
- for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
- gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
- nm = gen->d.dirn;
- break;
- }
- }
- if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
- return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
- }
- }
- if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
- return X509_V_OK;
-}
-
projects / bcm963xx.git / blobdiff